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hose who shape state and local fiscal policy have had a sustained
interest in the role that taxation plays in the economic development of states, regions, cities, and special districts or zones. At
least 75 studies of employment growth, investment growth, or firm
location include an analysis of taxes. Interest in the topic is fueled further
when firms complain about the business climate in general or about
taxation in particular. State or local policymakers then have the unenviable task of deciphering firms’ complaints and deciding whether additional tax incentives and lower taxes represent economic rents or constitute a timely and necessary response to keep firms in place.
Tax policy is not considered by firms or policymakers in isolation
from other aspects of site selection, including benefits from public goods
that might accrue to firms or to its workers. The literature also has
pointed to a number of other variables as important determinants of firm
location or employment growth decisions. Nonetheless, I leave the
discussion of expenditures and of special tax abatement and incentive
programs to other papers at this symposium, and this paper will limit its
scope to the role of taxation.
At one level, that tax policy influences economic behavior has
become a basic tenet for economic policymakers. For example, taxation is
assumed to influence multinational firms’ financial decisions about
repatriation of profits. Periodically, the World Bank relates economic
performance in developing countries to the level of taxation and finds
that countries with lower marginal tax rates have higher economic
growth. In the United States, at least some economists believe that cutting
federal taxes would spur enough growth in the national economy that the
budget deficit would increase by only 73 percent of the tax cut. Moreover,
recent evidence by Auerbach and Hassett (1992) suggests that the user
cost of capital plays an important role in stimulating nonresidential fixed
investment in the United States.
In the state and local area, researchers have struggled mightily over

the past 20 years to resolve the extent to which tax
policy influences the level and distribution of employment and investment among states or regions. Bartik
(1994a,b) has suggested that the interregional elasticity of economic activity with respect to taxes is between 20.1 and 20.6, or that 10 percent lower taxes
will raise employment, investment, or firm births
between 1 and 6 percent. These findings have implications for state and local tax policy. However, the
range of the elasticity is not estimated with much
precision, and it matters a great deal to policymakers
whether the elasticity is 20.1, 20.6, or somewhere in
between.

Policymakers’ keen interest in the
elasticity of economic activity
with respect to taxes suggests
that states and regions are
indeed interested in manipulating
their tax systems in an attempt
to attract business or
to foster growth.

or to foster growth. In effect, many states engage in a
form of industrial policy using taxes as their primary
instrument. To some, this appears to come at the
expense of following the tax policy advice mentioned
above, which is based on tax neutrality concepts that
are advanced by broad tax bases and low marginal tax
rates. Such a tax system might, in the longer run, more
effectively foster economic activity and growth.
In the next section some conceptual, measurement, and estimation issues are discussed. The second
section summarizes the empirical results on taxation
for studies examining various types of investments.
Results for interstate or interregional studies receive
the most emphasis here, but intra-regional location
studies are also discussed. There is also a growing
literature on whether taxes matter to international
location decisions. The results from these studies are
presented as well, because evidence regarding the
range of the elasticity of investment and employment
growth with respect to international tax differences
may give additional insight into the size of the tax
elasticities across states. A third section focuses on
some additional considerations of concern to policymakers. The paper closes with the major issues for
state and local tax policymakers with respect to economic development.

Conceptual and Estimation Issues
This paper will argue that the wide range of the
elasticity estimates has less to do with the type of
activity being measured than with the variations in
data, time periods, and other variables used in the
estimation equation. In effect, the results are not very
reliable and change depending on which variables are
included in the estimation equation or which time
period is analyzed.
Fiscal experts advising on tax policy have long
suggested that states and localities levy taxes with low
marginal tax rates and broad bases. Moreover, states
and localities should not use tax systems to redistribute income among residents or economic sectors,
because of the potential for firm and household flight
(Feldstein and Vaillant 1994). Instead, redistribution of
income, to the extent desirable, should be done
through state and local expenditures or, better yet, be
done by the central government.
Policymakers’ keen interest in the elasticity of
economic activity with respect to taxes suggests that
states and regions are indeed interested in manipulating their tax systems in an attempt to attract business
38
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Most studies relating economic development to
tax policy and other variables can be said to use ad hoc
empirical specifications. Thus, at best, these studies
demonstrate statistical association rather than show
the nature of the relationship between tax policy and
economic development.
In effect, the model that underlies most empirical
work is a profit or cost function. Manufacturing industries, which typically sell their products in national
and international markets, are generally modeled independent of local area demand, as these firms might
be most footloose and hence sensitive to local cost
factors. But manufacturing firms may be choosing
location in part on the basis of regional markets. For
example, a manufacturing firm might want to locate in
the Midwest, the South, or even near California owing
to market considerations. In such cases, regional
rather than local markets might be a key variable
shaping the firm’s location decision. Nonmanufacturing industries, which are more likely to serve a local
market, have to consider both local cost and local
market factors in their location decisions. Thus, modNew England Economic Review

els must be carefully specified and include both cost
and market factors.
Dependent Variables
The most common measures of economic development are income, employment, investment, plant
expansions, relocations, and births. Studies done before 1980 generally used aggregate employment or
employment growth data and analyzed a single period of cross-sectional data across states. As an example, a typical data set from a 1970s study included
manufacturing employment in each of the 48 contiguous states in a specific year or manufacturing
employment growth in each of the 48 states during
some time period. Investment decisions were rarely
examined, and only a few studies used income as
a dependent variable. The preoccupation with employment in part reflects the importance that policymakers attach to jobs and job growth in their regions
or states. Job growth, despite down-sizing, rightsizing, and productivity growth in manufacturing, is
still the variable politicians identify most often with
prosperity.
Nonetheless, policymakers and researchers have
become much more sophisticated consumers and producers of these data. Job stability in manufacturing in
a region is not necessarily an indicator of stagnation.
Relatively high productivity growth might mean
fewer new jobs, but it also may mean competitive
manufacturing firms that provide steady employment
and relatively high wages.
Income levels, income growth, and investment
measures have been used less frequently in studies of
state and local economic development. Personal income data are not necessarily good measures of economic activity in a region or state, as the income data
include measures of dividends paid, capital gains, and
income produced outside of the area or region. Moreover, local income data are not readily available for
inter-Census years. (The U.S. Department of Commerce has produced a gross state product series, but
those data are available only until 1992.) Wage and
salary data or earnings are available by place of work,
however, and could be used as a measure of locationspecific economic activity.
Investment data, while good measures of economic activity, have not received much attention at
the state and local level, despite the long-standing
attention given to the link between investment and tax
policy at the national level (Hall and Jorgenson 1967;
Auerbach and Hassett 1992). Investment data are not
March/April 1997

as readily available at the state and local levels as they
are at the national level.
Nonetheless, investment has appropriately received more attention in recent studies. One reason is
that manufacturing industries have invested heavily
in the past 15 years to modernize plants and raise
productivity. At the same time they have downsized
their work forces. While the share of nonagricultural
employment in manufacturing has declined steadily
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the share of nonagricultural output in manufacturing has remained constant. Thus, investment may be an important measure
of manufacturing presence in a region, and some
researchers have modeled investment rather than employment decisions at a regional or state level.

Researchers’ preoccupation with
employment reflects the
importance that policymakers
attach to jobs and job growth in
their regions. Job growth is still
the variable politicians identify
most often with prosperity.
The 1980s brought studies using micro data and
examining firm births, relocations, and branch plants.
Most of the research focus was again on manufacturing industries. Typically in these studies, the dependent variable is the number of plant births or a logit
model based on numbers of plants in a state or local
area.
The location of foreign direct investments began
to receive more attention in the later 1980s and in the
1990s. The explanatory variables used in these studies
are similar to those used in other studies of plant
location. However, the taxation of foreign plants is
complicated by international tax rules governing corporations and individuals who are taxed in more than
one country. These complications will be discussed
below.
Explanatory Variables and Measurement
The profit functions that undergird empirical
work on economic growth and firm location behavior
include as variables the cost of inputs such as labor,
New England Economic Review
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energy, capital, and taxes, as well as public expenditure variables, agglomeration economies, and other
environmental factors. Indicators of market size, such
as population and per capita income, are generally
included to represent local demand.
An implicit assumption in most studies is that
ultimately the net return to capital is the same across
states or localities, because if net returns were different, capital would relocate to obtain a higher net
return and such relocations would equalize net returns. Variations in the gross-of-tax cost of capital are
determined by variations in taxes on capital in the
state or locality. Thus, studies exclude the net return to
capital (assumed in equilibrium to be the same across
regions) from the model, and include taxes or tax rates
sufficient to capture the variations in gross returns that
induce plant movements and other shifts in employment or investment activity.
Non-fiscal variables. Labor costs typically are measured using the average gross manufacturing wage
rate in the state. Variations in fringe benefits and other
costs such as workers’ compensation or unemployment insurance have not entered most models because

Average wages in a state
probably do not represent the
wages that firms actually face
in choosing locations within
a state. Energy costs also are
not precisely measured.
data are either lacking (in the case of fringe benefits) or
not readily available (in the cases of workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance). Moreover, average wages in a state probably do not represent the
wages that firms actually face in choosing locations
within the state. In fact, in any state, wages typically
are higher in larger urban areas than in smaller urban
areas or rural locations.
Energy costs also are not precisely measured.
Studies typically include either state averages or energy costs in a particular area of each state. To the
extent that energy prices are not uniform within a
state, the state average does not reflect energy costs
throughout the state. The second approach may also
mismeasure the energy costs that employers face,
40
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unless employment growth in a state is concentrated
in the area where energy costs happen to have been
measured.
Studies have not generally found energy costs to
be significant determinants of plant location or of
employment growth, however. Moreover, with deregulation of energy prices and production, natural gas
prices, at least, are likely to be more uniform across the
country now than they were 10 years ago. Electricity
prices have not been deregulated as quickly as natural
gas prices, partly because electrical energy is not as
easily transmitted across regions as natural gas. However, with deregulation, energy costs are likely to lose
what limited influence they may have had on firm
location decisions, as energy costs become more uniform across states and regions.
Other factors that researchers hypothesize influence firm location and economic growth are unionization of the labor force and right-to-work laws. Agglomeration economies also figure prominently as
variables influencing firm location and economic
growth. Numerous studies find that agglomeration
economies have large and statistically significant effects on firm location. The implication is that when a
region has firms in a particular industry or industry
group, the region will likely attract more such firms.
This might occur because firms want to take advantage of technological transfers when industries are
concentrated or because of the presence of a labor
force with skills needed in a particular industry.
Tax and expenditure variables. The fiscal variables
receive much attention in this literature. These variables are what policymakers can control, and they
want to know what effect these variables have on
economic growth and firm location. The impact of
taxes on firms is difficult to measure, because accurate
measurement relies in part on the incidence of the tax.
For example, the state corporate income tax, depending on the incidence of the tax, might reduce the
return to capital or the return to labor, or affect the
price of output or land. The incidence of the tax
therefore affects how sensitive firms are to it. If labor is
immobile, corporate taxes may fall on labor and not
affect firm profits and location. On the other hand, if
the corporate tax is borne by capital, firm location
decisions are more likely to be affected.
Another aspect of the fiscal environment is the
quality and quantity of services provided by government. If government is providing the level of services
that residents and firms demand, then taxes may still
matter at the margin, as there may be better methods
of taxation. But higher taxes that do not buy proporNew England Economic Review

tionately more or better services are more likely to
deter some firms from specific locations.
Firms may also value some services and not
others. For example, firms may value transportation
infrastructure to move their products and inputs, or
value high-quality primary and secondary educational systems to attract workers to the area. They may
not value higher state spending on welfare, prisons,
or other social programs. (See Ronald Fisher, below,
for a summary of this literature.) The point here is that
studies need to include both the taxation and the
services the taxes buy in their estimating equations.
Some studies have included only police and fire
services along with taxes as determinants of firm
location or economic growth, but firms’ interest in
expenditures may not be limited to police and fire
services. As for any other class of variable, omitting
relevant expenditure variables might bias the results.

The fiscal variables—taxes, the
quality and quantity of services
provided by government—are
what policymakers can control,
and they want to know what effect
these variables have on economic
growth and firm location.
Helms (1985) developed an innovative approach
to including fiscal variables in the empirical work. He
formulated a budget equation for the jurisdiction in
question, in his case, the state. For state and local
governments combined, the budget deficit (or surplus)
is equal to the sum of all state and local revenue
sources (denoted by subscript i) less the sum of state
and local spending on various functions (denoted
by j): Deficit (surplus) 5 ( REV (i) 2 ( EXP (j). Helms
then includes all but one of the revenue and expenditure items in the estimating equation for economic
growth in the states.
The advantage of this approach is that all current
revenue sources and all current expenditures are
included in the growth model, as opposed to the
researcher imposing restrictions by omitting certain
revenue or expenditure variables from the estimating
equation. Even more important, time-series models
that do not account for all expenditures and revenues
March/April 1997

leave open the question of how the increased tax
revenues are used, when simulations are done to
assess the effect of tax increases on economic activity.
The budget equation attempts to close the model so
that increases in taxes are accounted for either by
increased spending or by reduced deficits (increased
surpluses).
The disadvantages of the budget equation approach stem from two sources: All variables in the
equation typically have been deflated by income or
population, and the approach complicates the interpretation of the coefficients and makes it difficult to
determine a simple tax elasticity. On the first point, for
example, as an indicator of service levels, primary and
secondary education expenditures should be measured per pupil rather than per capita or as a percentage of income. If states have different pupil-to-population ratios, then education expenditure per capita
may mismeasure the amount spent on educating
children.
On the second point, one simple tax elasticity
cannot be calculated because including the other revenue and expenditure variables implies that the full
budget impact of a tax change (or any fiscal change)
must be accounted for; in particular, the use to which
the tax revenues would be put (changes in spending,
other taxes, or the deficit) affects the employment/
investment response. For estimation purposes, one of
the revenue or expenditure variables from the budget
equation must be excluded from the estimating equation in order to avoid exact multicollinearity. The
estimated coefficients on any fiscal variable remaining
in the equation are then interpreted relative to the
omitted numeraire.
Helms omitted welfare spending from the estimating equation; in this framework, the direct interpretation of any of the estimated coefficients on the
fiscal variables is that a change in that fiscal variable is
offset by a compensating change in welfare spending.
Of course, it is possible to calculate the effects of other
fiscal experiments. For example, suppose one wanted
to decrease corporate taxes and exactly offset the
revenue loss with an increase in sales taxation. For this
experiment, the difference in the coefficients on the
corporate and sales tax variables would form the basis
of the elasticity calculation. Any number of fiscal
experiments are possible, and the net effect of fiscal
actions would be summarized by the coefficients on
each of the affected fiscal variables. The tax elasticity
would vary, however, with the specific experiment.
The value in the Helms approach is to point out
that taxes are not changed in a vacuum; reduced taxes
New England Economic Review
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by themselves will generally add to the deficit. Researchers and policymakers need to be clearer about
how tax reductions are paid for. But if taxes do affect
economic activity, at least part of any tax reduction
(and deficit increase) would be offset by new revenues
generated by the new economic activity. This makes
the fiscal variables themselves endogenous, a point
that is addressed below. Bartik (this issue) makes
similar points about the limitations inherent in the
Helms approach.
Measuring tax variables. In most of the literature,
tax variables are measured either by the nominal tax
rates for each tax or by the ratio of the revenue
collected to personal income or population. Of these
two measures, the ratio of revenues collected to income or population (average tax burden) is better,
because it captures aspects of both the nominal rate of
the tax and the tax base, whereas the nominal rate
approach takes no account of the definition of the tax
base and is more likely to mismeasure the burden of
the tax. Neither approach typically incorporates the
tax incentives offered to specific firms or other types of
location subsidies.

Most explanatory variables,
from wages to taxes, are measured
imprecisely relative to what
firms actually pay. This makes
it difficult to know if study
results accurately represent
the impact of these variables.
In addition, a number of underlying provisions in
the tax code can adversely affect particular industries.
Some examples include how a state’s tax code provisions for depreciation of capital interface with the
federal depreciation laws; corporate income tax
throwback rules, when corporations with operations
in more than one state are not taxed on the share of
profits allocated to another state; tax nexus principles
that determine the conditions under which a state can
tax a company that is not physically located in the
state; and a host of other practices embedded in the tax
codes of states. These aspects of the tax code are
largely unmeasured in most studies and may affect
locations and growth in as yet unknown ways.
42
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For a newly locating firm or expanding business,
the effect taxes would have on the rate of return to
investment is better measured by the marginal rate
of taxation on the investment or the user cost (Hall
and Jorgenson 1967). James Papke (1995) and Leslie
Papke (1987) have used a representative tax approach
to measure the marginal after-tax rate of return on
investment (or the marginal rate of business taxes).
Their approach takes a representative firm in each
industry of interest and estimates the after-tax rate
of return to the firm’s investment in each different
state. The size of the after-tax return depends on the
number of taxes, the treatment of depreciation, the
availability of tax credits and exemptions for new
investment, and the interaction of federal, state, and
local taxes, as well as the structure and location of
existing operations, the distribution of product sales,
the type of asset, the tax rates, and other tax factors.
Using this approach, they have successfully estimated
after-tax rates of return for representative firms in
various states.
Their approach takes account very well of many
hidden tax code differences among states. For example, James Papke’s recent study (1995) examines the
impact that tax incentives have on the after-tax rate
of return. He finds that, at least for the six Great
Lakes states, tax incentives (investment tax credits
and property tax abatements) have very modest effects
on the net returns to new investment. More important, he notes that certain tax provisions, such as
the corporate apportionment formula and the treatment of sales to non-nexus states, affect the aftertax rate of return more than tax incentives offered
by states to new firms. He reports that the sensitivity
of profit rates to the throwback rule is about double
that to property tax abatement and investment tax
subsidies.
This approach has elevated the thinking about
state and local taxes among both researchers and
policymakers. While the approach necessitates a number of assumptions about the incidence of taxes and
requires one to believe that the representative firm in
an industry adequately characterizes marginal investment tax rates for all firms in the industry, the model
makes these assumptions transparent. In contrast,
when average measures of tax burdens are used in the
analysis, the incidence assumptions lie in the background and are not explicitly dealt with in the model
or the estimation. Moreover, the average tax rate
approach is not specific to industries and certainly not
to firms. On these criteria as well as on the general
notion of measuring marginal as opposed to average
New England Economic Review

tax rates, the Papkes’ approach considerably improves
the measurement of tax variables.
However, studies utilizing the after-tax approach
typically omit other aspects of taxation from consideration. Personal income and sales taxes might influence firm location as well as the after-tax rate of return
on investment. Moreover, the treatment of expenditures in models using the after-tax rate of return
approach has been less than thorough (Tannenwald
1996; L. Papke 1991 and 1987). These limitations are
not inherent in the measure of returns to investment.
Researchers using the representative tax approach
should consider using a wider array of tax and expenditure variables in their models.
In summary, the point to underscore in this
section is the imprecision with which most explanatory variables are measured. Everything from wages
to taxes is imprecisely measured, relative to what
firms may actually pay. This mismeasurement makes
it difficult to know whether the empirical results from
these studies accurately represent the impact of these
variables.
Econometric Issues
While many econometric issues could be discussed and one (specification bias) has been raised
above, simultaneous equation bias (the explanatory
variables might be simultaneously determined with
the dependent variable) is the most common problem
in the research on this topic. This bias is more likely to
occur when aggregate data are analyzed. For example,
in a model explaining employment growth using
workers’ wages, taxes, and other explanatory variables, the level of taxes and wages might be explained
in part by the employment growth. If not accounted
for, this simultaneous determination will bias the
coefficient estimates.
Simultaneity bias can be corrected in a variety of
standard ways, including instrumenting the simultaneous explanatory variables and using lagged values
of the explanatory variables in the estimating equation
instead of contemporaneous values. The lag period
used is generally arbitrary. However, for panel data
sets, a one-period lag on the explanatory variable is
commonly used as a pseudo-instrumental variable in
the equation, because the lagged value of each explanatory variable is thought to be the best predictor of
each contemporaneous explanatory variable. However, one should use the predicted value of the contemporaneous explanatory variable as an explanatory
variable (even if the predicted value is estimated from
March/April 1997

the lagged value) and not the lagged value itself,
because the predicted value is more likely to be
purged of the contemporaneous correlation with the
dependent variable.
Another econometric issue is rooted in the use of
more sophisticated panel data sets. Most early studies
used a cross section of data for a single year, and
suggested that the results generalized across time
periods. Newer studies, starting with Helms (1985),
introduced panel data or included more than one year
of data in the analysis. Helms analyzed data for 14
years (from 1965 to 1979) and 48 states. The panel data
allow the use of fixed effects (state) to address heterogeneity and reduce omitted variable bias. However,
panel data estimation assumes that the regime governing the empirical equations does not change
throughout the time period of the data and thus the
values of the coefficients remain the same for all time
periods in the analysis.
Carroll and Wasylenko (1994), using panel data to
analyze employment levels in states in the 1970s and
1980s, find that taxes were less important in the 1980s
than in the 1970s. Nonetheless, provided the regime is
constant or that allowance is made for regime shifts,
estimation using panel data can be more robust, as the
larger data set allows correction for heterogeneity and
specification problems.
Data Used
As noted above, aggregate data on economic
activity include income, investment, employment, and
gross state product. Aggregate employment growth is
a combination of firm births, deaths, relocation, expansions, and new branch plants, and each component of
employment growth may occur for different underlying reasons. Micro data allow one to focus on each
aspect of employment growth and obtain separate
elasticity estimates for each aspect. Thus, some researchers prefer micro data and believe that these data
provide a clearer picture of economic activity. Moreover, specific knowledge about factors affecting each
component of economic growth is of interest to policymakers.
Researchers have used micro data from Dun &
Bradstreet, Fortune 500 firms, and independent surveys. A relatively new source of information is microlevel firm and plant data from the U.S. Bureau of the
Census; these data are available only to employees of
the Census and to those the Census designates as
employees. While this presents some barriers to use,
nonetheless these data represent a rich source of
New England Economic Review
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information for researchers interested in
firm location or other aspects of firm
behavior.
Beginning with Schmenner (1978;
1980) and continuing with Carlton (1979;
1983), studies have used micro data on
branch plant locations, firm births, or
plant expansions as dependent (lefthand-side) variables. The location patterns are examined within states or
localities. Estimation techniques can become more complicated, as the model
now gives each plant an opportunity to
select among the 48 states or regions.
The micro data are a series of decisions
about whether (1) or not (0) to locate in a
particular state or region, and multinomial logit analysis is used to accommodate the data and the decision model.
Using an alternative estimation approach, Leslie Papke (1991) has used a
count model, where in essence she
looks at the micro data and adds up or
counts how many plant births occurred
in each state. Regardless of the estimation technique, in most studies using
micro data, the explanatory variables are
measured as aggregate values, so that
the estimation examines how individual
firms respond to aggregate explanatory
variables. In the section below, the differences in the tax elasticity results
found in studies using aggregate and
micro data are highlighted.

Table 1

Summary of Econometric Results of Tax Effects on
Business Location: Interregional and Interstate Studies
Dependent Variable

Employment or Employment Growth
(Aggregate Data)
Total Employment
6 studies (5)
[2.85 to .0]
2.58
Manufacturing
Employment
Other Employment
Investment (Aggregate Data)
Investment in
Manufacturing
Gross State Product,
Income, or Value-Added
(Aggregate Data)
Births or Location (Micro data)
Manufacturing

3 studies (2)
[2.16, 0]
2.11

13 studies (8)
[21.54 to .05]
2.10

2 studies (1)
[2.26, 0]

1 study (0)
2.02

1 study (0)
0

6 studies (3)
[21.02 to .54]
2.60 or 0

7 studies (6)
[2.36 to 2.10]
2.20

12 studies (7)
[2.88 to .27]
2.07

1 study (0)
2.14

3 studies (2)
[2.40, 0]
2.18

19 studies (15)
[215.7 to .6]
2.20

The cells of the table report the number of studies where an elasticity measure can be
estimated, the number of those studies in which the tax elasticity was statistically
significant (in parentheses), the range of elasticity estimates [in brackets], and the median
elasticity. The source for the results is Bartik (1991), pp. 216 –34. The results reported
there are regrouped by type of study for this table. Studies done since 1991 (cited in the
references) are added to the table.

Bartik (1991) has provided a thorough catalog of
employment, investment, and location studies. A few
studies of investment and employment have been
done since his review and they are included in this
review. (Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) and Goss and
Phillips (1994) examine total employment, for example.) Still other studies done since Bartik’s review
examine the locations of foreign direct investments.
The recent interest in foreign investment reflects data
availability as well as a large increase in foreign direct
investment during the 1980s.
Table 1 reports the tax elasticity results for studies
of interregional or interstate aggregate economic
growth and domestic firm location, by type of analyMarch/April 1997
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Tax Elasticitya

sis. The results are sorted by whether an overall tax
elasticity or a business tax (corporate income tax or
property tax) elasticity is measured. The results are
also sorted by type of data used: state- (or regional-)
level aggregate data or micro data on location. Within
the aggregate category, results are reported for total
employment, manufacturing employment, and manufacturing investment, and for gross state product,
income, or value-added measures of economic activity. The studies using micro data generally have
examined manufacturing plant births.
Two general observations can be made. First,
most of the studies focus on location, employment, or
investment decisions made by manufacturing firms.
Second, studies using micro data have largely focused
on the effect of business taxes on manufacturing
location, whereas studies using aggregate data have
generally examined the effect of total taxes on manufacturing employment.
New England Economic Review

All of these studies suffer from at least some of the
measurement and other difficulties noted above.
Nonetheless, the results based on a variety of data sets
over a long time period are more similar than they are
different. The range of the elasticity point estimates is
still fairly wide, however.
Interregional Studies
Bartik has suggested in his 1994 reviews that the
average elasticity is 20.3 for the tax responsiveness of
location and economic growth for states or regions,
and that the range of the elasticity estimates is between 20.1 and 20.6. The information in Table 1 for
each category of analysis (employment, investment,
and so on) recounts the number of studies reporting
tax elasticities, the number of studies in which the
elasticity is statistically significant, the range of the
elasticity estimates, and the median value of the
estimated tax elasticity. For the total tax responsiveness of aggregate economic activity (manufacturing
employment or investment, aggregate gross state
product, or other measures of output), 23 of the 38
studies report statistically significant elasticities, and
the median values of the estimates for various categories of analysis range from 20.58 to 20.02, with
most of the medians clustering around 20.1. For the
three studies examining the effect of total taxes using
micro data on location choice, the median elasticity
is 20.18.
Of the 34 studies (including those using aggregate
and micro data) examining business tax elasticities, 24
report statistically significant elasticity estimates. The
median values of these elasticity estimates cluster
between 0.0 and 20.26, indicating not much responsiveness of economic activity among regions to business taxes. Put another way, from studies using both
aggregate and micro data, a large share of the elasticity estimates indicate less responsiveness than the
20.3 average reported above.
Moreover, the results for the interregional effects
of taxes on economic activity are not stable. Elasticity
estimates range between implausibly high values of
215.7 in one or two studies to positive 0.54 in others.
Based on the reported median values, however, the
studies using micro data more consistently report
lower elasticity values than studies using the aggregate data.
Still, most policymakers are reluctant to dismiss
the possibility that taxes have statistically significant
effects on economic activity. Several carefully done
studies by respected researchers find tax elasticities
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larger than the 20.6 upper bound of Bartik’s range (L.
Papke 1991; McConnell and Schwab 1990; Munnell
1990; Bartik 1989; and Wasylenko and McGuire 1985).
But at least an equal number of researchers using
similar care and sophistication in their approaches
find small or statistically insignificant tax effects (Tannenwald 1996; Carroll and Wasylenko 1994; Wasylenko and Carroll 1991; McGuire and Wasylenko 1987;
Carlton 1983; Bradbury, Downs, and Small 1982;
Schmenner 1982; and Browne, Mieszkowki, and Syron
1980).
These differences apparently are not related to the
type of data used (aggregate or micro) in the study,
the other variables included in the analysis, or
whether taxes are measured using the representative
tax approach or the average tax approach. For example, L. Papke (1991) uses the representative tax approach and estimates relatively large tax elasticities in
three of the five industry groups that she examines.
Tannenwald (1996) also uses the representative tax
approach and finds smaller tax effects that are statistically insignificant.

Most policymakers are reluctant
to dismiss the possibility that
taxes have statistically significant
effects on economic activity.
Some of the variation in results may be related to
the time period that is analyzed. For example, Carroll
and Wasylenko (1994) estimate their model using data
from 1967 to 1988, and find that taxes have a larger
impact before 1982 than after. Some of the variation in
the results between time periods might be caused by
the consequences of interstate competition that encourages all states to reduce tax rates and burdens and
bring them more in line with those in neighboring
states. The more similar are tax rates across states, the
less influence taxes will have on location choice. James
Papke (1995), using the representative tax approach to
estimate 1995 marginal business tax rates, finds that
for the six Great Lakes states, the after-tax rates of
return to investment are so similar that there are
virtually no tax reasons to prefer one of these states
over another.
Policymakers often hear that higher state personal
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Table 2

Tax Elasticities for Foreign Investments and Plant Locations in the United States
Study

Analysis

Data Years

Tax Elasticity

Ondrich and Wasylenko
(1993)

Manufacturing plant births

1978 –1987

Corporate taxes 20.567.
Other taxes not significant.

Hines (1996)

State share of foreign
manufacturing investment

1987

Corporate income tax rate elasticity 20.65.

Woodward (1992)

Number of Japanese branch
plants

1980 –1989

Unitary taxation negatively affects
location.
Other tax rates not statistically significant.

Coughlin, Terza, and
Arromdee (1991)

Foreign direct investments by state

1981–1983

Not statistically significant.

Moore, Steece, and
Swenson (1987)

Net foreign investment in
manufacturing assets by state

1977–1981

Unitary taxation is statistically significant.
Tax burdens are not statistically
significant.

Luger and Shetty (1985)

Number of new foreign start-ups in
three industries

1979, 1981–1983

Negative for drug manufacturing.
Positive for industrial machinery and
motor vehicle production.

Source: Wasylenko (1994).

income taxes deter business location and employment
growth. Two studies (Wasylenko and McGuire 1985;
Goss and Phillips 1994) find that states with higher
personal taxes have lower employment growth. Carlton (1983) and others do not find statistically significant effects for personal taxes, however.
The fact that the tax elasticity results are unstable
is also reflected in the different conclusions drawn in
literature reviews on location choice. Two recent literature reviews (Lynch 1996; Kusmin 1994) find little
evidence that the level of state and local taxation
figures prominently in business-location decisions.
Lynch, in particular, notes that there is no evidence
that state and local tax cuts, when paid for by reducing
public services, stimulate economic activity or create
jobs. Moreover, state and local tax incentives and
financial inducements are not the only or even primary influences on business investment decisions.
On the other hand, Phillips and Goss (1995) have
done a meta-analysis, a statistically based and perhaps
more systematic approach to a literature review. In
effect, the analysis treats the estimated tax elasticities
as observations in a data set and regresses the tax
elasticities on explanatory variables describing the
estimation model used to obtain each elasticity. The
meta-analysis suggests that the average tax elasticity is
21.14, when public services and fixed effects are
included in the analysis. The average tax elasticity is
20.4 when the models include only taxes, however.
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Phillips and Goss point out that one would expect this
finding of a smaller (less negative) tax elasticity when
measures of service levels are excluded, because of
omitted variable bias. When no measures of services
are included, the coefficient on taxes also picks up any
(positive) effects of services on growth to the degree
that service levels and taxes are positively correlated
(as they typically are since higher taxes finance more
services).
While more systematic, the meta-analysis treats
all estimated tax elasticities the same, whether statistically significant or not, one of the flaws in the
analysis which the authors recognize. Moreover, a few
outlier elasticities could drive the statistical results.
The disagreement highlighted in these recent reviews
clearly underscores the instability of the elasticity
estimates.
Foreign Direct Investment
Table 2 reports results for recent location studies
of foreign direct investment in the United States. This
analysis is complicated by at least two aspects of
international taxation and state tax rules that apply to
multinational companies. Some home countries use
territorial tax systems, in which the home countries do
not tax the foreign investment. Foreign investors from
these countries may therefore be sensitive to United
States (host) country taxes. On the other hand, foreign
New England Economic Review

his 1996 paper, however.) There is some variation in
the results, as is the case for domestic investment.

Table 3

Summary of Econometric Results of Tax
Effects on Business Location: Intra-regional
Studies
Dependent Variable
Employment or Employment Growth
(Aggregate Data)
Total Employment

Manufacturing
Employment
Births or Location (Micro data)
Manufacturing

Other

Property or
Business Tax
Elasticitya

4 studies (3)
[21.95 to
2.81]
21.85
1 study (1)
2.79
5 studies (4)
[22.70 to .62]
21.59
1 study (1)
24.43

a

The cells of the table report the number of studies where an elasticity
measure can be estimated, the number of those studies in which the tax
elasticity was statistically significant (in parentheses), the range of elasticity estimates [in brackets], and the median elasticity. The source for the
results is Bartik (1991), pp. 216 –34. The results reported there are
regrouped by type of study for this table. Studies done since 1991 (cited
in references) are added to the table.

investors from home countries using residential tax
systems are subject to taxes in both host and home
countries (upon repatriation of profits), but receive a
tax credit in the home country for direct taxes paid in
the host country. For these investors, host country
taxes probably would not matter, if taxes in the host
country are lower than in the home country (and
hence fully creditable), but taxes may affect location if
host country taxes are higher than home country taxes
or if the investor is in an excess credit position. The
second issue is the definition of the profits that states
apportion. In the 1980s, up to 11 states applied a
worldwide unitary concept to determine the profits of
a foreign investor.
Worldwide unitary taxation is found to have a
negative effect on investment or branch plant location
in two of the six studies reported in Table 2. Two other
studies find that the corporate income tax rate itself
has a negative effect on investment or location. Moreover, both of the studies report a tax elasticity close to
20.6. (Hines reported the 20.65 elasticity estimate in a
seminar on his paper at Syracuse University in September 1996. This result is not explicitly reported in
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Intra-Regional Studies
Table 3 reports the elasticities of intra-regional
employment and location with respect to property or
business taxes. Fewer studies analyze intra-regional
elasticities than inter-regional elasticities. Of the 11
intra-regional studies reported here, four analyze total
employment, five examine manufacturing plant locations, one looks at aggregate manufacturing employment, and one looks at the location of industries other
than manufacturing. Nine of the 11 studies report
statistically significant tax elasticities.
A basic finding of this literature is that the smaller
the overall area over which a business is choosing a
location, the more similar are nontax factors across the
subareas. For example, a typical choice for a firm
might be whether to locate in a city or in one of its
suburbs. With a metropolitan-wide labor market, the
same labor force would be available to the firm in all
the areas being considered, and other cost factors,
such as energy, would also be similar across the area.
In this context, fiscal factors take on more significance.
Thus, the tax elasticities are expected to be higher in
intra-regional studies, and Bartik (1991) and others
have concluded that the intra-regional elasticity is
about 21.5.
In fact, Table 3 does show higher elasticities for
intra-regional studies than Table 1 shows for interregional ones. For example, for total employment and
manufacturing plant births (the two categories with
the most studies), the median intra-regional elasticities
are 21.85 and 21.59, respectively. For intra-regional
aggregate manufacturing employment and nonmanufacturing location, the elasticities are also high relative
to the interregional results. The tax elasticities within a
region appear to be at least four times the interregional elasticities.
Summary
Taxes do not appear to have a substantial effect on
economic activity among states. In part, states and
regions have acted to neutralize the effect of taxes by
adopting tax systems that are more alike. Without
significant differences in state tax systems, taxes will
not play a significant role in firm location and expansion. Given any particular tax elasticity estimate, however, the degree to which a specific state’s tax rate will
affect economic activity in the state depends on the
New England Economic Review
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degree to which the state’s tax burden deviates from
that in relevant comparison states. As long as the tax
elasticity is negative and significantly different from
zero, high-tax states will lose more economic activity
than average or low-tax states. Indeed, the highest-tax
states, such as Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New York,
have recently acknowledged that high taxes may be
responsible for the low rates of job creation in those
states (State Policy Reports 1994).
States appear to overestimate the degree to which
taxes affect economic outcomes and hence are not very
receptive to the finding that taxes have little effect nor
to the explanation that, from a national perspective,
firm location and economic activity are zero-sum
games for states. State policymakers feel pressure to
keep the state economy growing and producing jobs
for its citizens. Thus, other than stating that tax
elasticities are small, more specific advice for state
policymakers is needed.

Advice About Tax Policy
Courant (1994) has urged researchers in this area
to look beyond a count of the number of jobs created,
even if taxes do have significant effects on economic
activity. He reminds us that state government intervention to influence job growth is not always warranted. One reason for intervention might be the
existence of agglomeration economies that demand
temporary government subsidy or special tax treatment to get the industry beyond some critical mass.
This is similar to arguments made in the international
trade literature in favor of a country’s pursuit of an
industrial policy. Courant also notes, however, that
appropriate intervention might occur rarely and generally would involve more action than simply lowering taxes to attract more firms.
Both Courant (1994) and Bartik (1993) urge the
extension of our analysis to the beneficiaries of job
creation. For example, the social implications of job
creation, which persons or groups (the poor, single
mothers, or high-skilled workers) benefit from job
creation, should be addressed. The wage levels of the
new jobs as well as the nature of the jobs created are
also of interest. The creation of low-wage, part-time
jobs creates fewer economic benefits than full-time
jobs, for example.
The issue of what types of jobs are created and
who benefits from them is of special interest now,
given welfare reform and the need for many ablebodied persons to find jobs. Even if state fiscal policy
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instruments simply move jobs from one location to
another, this relocation of existing jobs might still be
looked upon favorably when the intention is to attract
jobs to a particular location.
Moreover, the specific tax reform chosen will
affect the types of jobs created. Generally, reductions
in capital or business taxes would attract more capitalintensive firms, which may pay higher wages and
benefit those with more education and job skills.
Reducing the highest personal income tax brackets
might attract firms that use more human capital in the
workplace and persons who have high earnings, such
as software developers and engineers. But neither
approach is likely to attract jobs for low-wage workers
and, indeed, tax policy may not appropriately be
directed at creating low-wage jobs.

The issue of what types of jobs
are created and who benefits
from them is of special interest
now, given welfare reform and
the need for many able-bodied
persons to find jobs.
Migration of workers into and out of areas can
reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of targeting certain jobs to residents in specific locations. Marston
(1985, p. 74), for example, has argued that shocks or
subsidies in particular labor markets only temporarily
reduce unemployment in the area. In a short period of
time, in-migration of workers to the area eliminates
the benefits to the original residents.
In contrast to that argument, Cross (1988) and
Bartik (1991) contend that even temporary employment of previously unemployed persons imparts
work skills (hysteresis effects) and leaves them permanently more likely to find jobs. Nonetheless, based
on 18 studies, Bartik (1993) concludes that 60 to 90
percent of jobs created by employment programs go,
in the long run, to in-migrants to the area or unintended beneficiaries. Even more problematic is a recent finding by Blanchard and Katz (1992) suggesting
that in the long run, new in-migrants to the area take
all of the newly created jobs.
Disagreement can also be found in the literature
over which racial, gender, and age groups benefit
New England Economic Review

from job growth. Several studies find that job creation
programs increase employment more among blacks
than among whites (Frey and Speare 1988; Moore and
Laramore 1990; Bound and Holzer 1991; Freeman
1991; Bartik 1992), while other researchers find no
differences (Ihlanfeldt 1992) or even smaller job effects
for blacks than for whites (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist 1991).
Ladd concludes in her 1994 survey that placebased subsidies and even people-based, place-based
subsidies have failed to raise employment levels and
the well-being of the targeted residents. Her results
relate specifically to enterprise zone-type programs,
where the programs are costly and the benefits elusive. In fact, spatially targeted subsidies in the form of
tax reductions are, by most evidence, inefficient mechanisms by themselves for increasing the employment
of residents in states and regions.
While competition for jobs will probably remain a
component of state and local tax policy, firms may
favor a stable business tax system that efficiently funds
the services demanded by businesses and citizens of
the state. A general policy of low tax rates and broad
tax bases should remain the standard for states. States
with structural deficits, high marginal tax rates, and
inefficient service delivery should pay more attention
to the effects of taxes on economic development.
However, a more effective policy might be to reform
the tax system, realign expenditure to citizen demands, and close the deficits over time. This will likely
attract more firms than will tax reductions that are not
accompanied by systematic fiscal reform. In fact, policymakers’ heightened concern about tax effects on
business may signal deeper fiscal problems that small
changes in the tax code are unlikely to remedy.

Conclusions
The competition for industry among states is
unlikely to end, and the effect of taxation and fiscal
incentives is likely to remain of interest to policymakers. This review of the literature suggests that taxes
have a small, statistically significant effect on interregional location behavior. The suggested estimate of
the interregional elasticity is 20.2. However, all elas-

March/April 1997

ticity estimates must be viewed in the context of the
state and its fiscal position vis-à-vis other states. The
effect of a specific state’s taxes depends not only on the
elasticity, but also on the extent to which the state’s
overall (state and local) tax levels are significantly
different from the average of the states it competes
against. A large deviation from the average tax level,
multiplied by the tax elasticity, will yield a large
location, employment, or investment effect.
Intra-regional studies produce tax elasticities that
are quadruple or more those found in the interregional studies. With other cost and market variables
very similar among different locations within a region,
fiscal differences within the region play a more significant role in location choice.
Most important, ad hoc tax reforms should not be
used as a back-door remedy to systematic deficiencies
in a tax or fiscal system or in the name of improving
the business climate. A band-aid approach to tax
reform creates more inequities and inefficiencies than
it resolves. When the business climate of a state
becomes so problematic that tax laws need to be
changed routinely to attract businesses, the practice
may be a symptom of problems with the tax system
itself and a signal that systematic tax reform might be
a more useful approach. In effect, tax reform treats
existing and new firms equally, and responsible reform will also systematically account for any tax
revenue lost due to reform. It is probably the case that
sound tax and fiscal policy obviates many of the tax
perks that businesses seek.
As a result of federal reform, new responsibilities
for welfare spending represent fiscal challenges for the
states; state welfare expenditures will likely increase,
possibly leading to more variations in taxes among
states. States that handle welfare reform and growth in
Medicaid expenses in line with their own community’s preferences and with fiscal integrity will, in the
long run, attract jobs and investment.
Fiscal reform should move toward more efficient
tax systems and expenditure accountability. Where
distributional and economic development considerations are concerned, policymakers should press analysts for a more complete understanding of the beneficiaries of any policy action.
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